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1. INTRODUCTION 
"The Court of Appeal has declared that the formation 
of the respondent company and the agreement to take 
over the business of the appellant were a scheme 
"contrary to the true intent and meaning of the 
Companies Act". I know of no means of ascertaining 
what is the intent and neaning of the Companies Act 
except by examining its provisions and finding what 
regulations it has imposed as a condition of t::::-ading 
with limited liability .... we have to interpret the 
law, not make it." Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd, per 
Herschell, LJ1 . 
Thus the starting point of the court in this seminal case 
(which has been followed ever since in regard to corporate 
personality) was to interpret the law as they foun~ it in 
the Act - if the formalities had been complied ;•ii th, a 
separate judicial person came into being: 
2 
"The Company is at law a different person altogether 
Zrom the subscribers to the memorandum; and, although 
it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as before, and the same persons 
a::::-e managers, and ::he sa::.e ,._ . cranes !"eceive the 
the company is not in law the agent of the 
subscribers or trustee for them"2 
Salomon v Salc=cn i Co :i=i:ed (1897] AC 22 at ~S-6 
per Macnaughten, LJ in Salomon's case, op cit at 51 
- 2 -
Thus one of the essential characteristics of a company is 
its separate identity from that of its members, and this 
is so no matter how absurd the result may seem at first 
glance. 
The above English case was accepted in our law in Dadoo v 
Krugersdorp .'•!unicipal Council 3 • In that case, -'-'-,c, i.....1. ... - AD 
accepted that '.. - ~ t:ne raci.. that all the me~bers of a cc~pany 
·,•iere Asiatic, did not mean that the conpa.ny could be 
regarded as Asiatic, and thus the then statute prohibiting 
Asiatics fron owning land in the Transvaal could net be 
applied to a company: 
"A registered company is a legal persona distinct 
from the members who compose it It is not 
necessary for me to consider the very few cases where 
in our law the courts have 'pierced the corporate 
veil'. Suffice to say that in the present case I c~n 
conceive of no principle of law whereby such a 
radical step would be justified." 
Thus corporate personality "draws a veil" o.ver what lies. 
behind a company, and generally the courts will not look 
bevond this. ~he cccr~s ~ave, however, reccgnised t~at: in 
certain cases it may be permissable to disregard the 
separate existence of the company, and lift the "veil 11 
created by incorporation. This doctrine is exercised 
3 1920 AD 530 
{ 
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sparingly, however, and has seldom been applied in South 
Africa4 • So too in Great Britain: 
"However, it must be said at once that (the cases) 
reveal no consistent principle beyond a refusal by 
the legislature and the judiciary to apply the logic 
of the principle laid down in Salomon's case where it 
is too flagrantly opposed to justice, convenier.ce or 
the interests of Revenue.":: 
Gower goes on to discuss the various situations where the 
courts have been prepared to lift the veil, and attenpts 
to draw several general conclusions 6 , but closes his 
discussion as follows: 
"Further than this it is not possible to go in 
attempting to present in a rational for:::i a 
development which has been essentially haphazard and 
irrational. Until very recently, the courts and the 
legal profession have failed to see the 
interconnection between the various .situations in 
which the problem arises, with the result that 
relevant decisions taken in one context have not been 
ci ::ed in litigation i.n anothe!:" cor:~2:x-:.. Tha7., at 
least, is better now. But we have not made much 
progress in producing principles or a consistent 
4 Cf Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Conr:.rolling Investments (?ty) 
Ltd 1993 (2) SA 784 (C) at 819G 
5 Gcwer ."fode::.-."l Company .:aw, 4th ed, ::2 
6 Gower op cit 112-138 
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policy. The most that can be said is that the courts' 
policy is to lift the veil if they think that justice 
demands it and they are not constrained by contrary 
binding authority. The results in individual cases 
may be commendable, but it smacks of palm-tree 
justice rather than the application of legal rule. 117 
This note, therefore, will not attempt to develop a unified 
exposition of the concept i~ cur law, as it is not possible 
to draw consistent principles from the chaos, save to echo 
Gower in finding that each case must needs be decided on 
its own merits. The fact that it may be difficult to ~ake 
a decision, and that there is a paucity of principle on 
which to base such a decision will not deter a court from 
making such a determination, however, and nor will it 
prevent matters in which the doctrine may have relevance, 
from coming before our courts. It is, however, clear ~hat 
the doctrine must be considered in relation to spec~fic 
facts, and with this in mind, it is proposed to consider 
the applicability of the doctrine to a common tax-avoidance 
based structure used in South Africa, wheLeby the use of 
a property is split from the ownership thereof, thereby 
effectively allowing a deduction for income tax purposes 
of a large part of the capital cost of a ;roperty, wtich 
capital cost would not normally have been so deductible. 
The scheme itself will be covered as briefly as possible, 
whereafter the recognised areas where the courts have 
7 Gower op cit 138 
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proved willing to lift the veil will be each be discussed -
and the facts of the scheme be applied to each such 
category in turn. 
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2. THE TAX AVOIDANCE SCH&"iE 
The structure, or scheme, is commonly used to finance the 
purchase of land and the construction of improvements 
thereon. Generally, an investment company may, for 
accounting purposes, depreciate buildings over their 
but no deduction of the capital cost of the 
building or land is allc~ed against income for tax 
~urposes. This is in contradistinction to the situation in 
respect of machinery for exaDple, where the accounting and 
tax treatment coincides and the plant may be written O ,=~ - J.. 
against income for tax purposes. There have accordingly 
been attempts to develop structures within the Income Tax 
.Act8 where such a write-off for tax purposes may be 
obtained. Typically, the sch8me operates as follows: 
The investing company (Investec) would identify a site 
development, but instead of purchasing the property itself, 
it would be purchased by a third party, preferably a 
company specialising in the development of property, e.g. 
a project management specialist. 7his company (Devco) WC' 1 ld 
have no connection with Investec, nor with any shareholder 
of Devco (i.e. a completely arms-length transaction). It 
would treat the property as trading stock in its hands, 
thus deducting the purchase price for income tax purposes. 
Simultaneously with executing the contract of purchase, 
Devco would enter into two further contracts - the first, 
8 Act 58 of 1962, as amended 
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a contract of lease with Investco whereby Devco undertook 
to develop the property to Investec' s requirements (as 
stipulated) and to lease the completed building and 
property to Investco for a considerable period (typically 
ten or twenty years). The rental payable in terms of the 
lease would either be payable as one lump sum at the 
commencement of the lease, or if payable annually it NOUld 
be settled by t~e issue of promissory notes (payable on the 
respective due dates of the annual rental paynents) by 
Investec to Devco at the commencement of the lease. (Devco 
would then discount these notes with a com~ercial bank, and 
thus effectively receive the rental consideration for the 
entire period of the lease, suitably reduced to take 
account of the discount factor, immediately). The second 
contract would be with a another company Propco, whereby 
Propco purchased the property, subject to the lease (i.e., 
the bare dominion); As (under either scenario) no =ental 
would be forthcoming for some twenty years, Propco would 
pay only a small fraction of the total cost of the 
developed land (i.e. the · price would be equal to the 
present value of the narket ~alue of the property at the 
end of the lease, discounted at the expected long-ter~ cost 
of capital over the period of the lease). 
Devco would then balance its expenditure on the purchase 
of the property and in developing same to Investec' s 
requirements, with its income from the rent paid up front, 
together with the receipts from the sale of the ;:,are 
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dominion to Propco. Any balance would comprise its 
development profit. 
In the classic (or "pure") form of the structure, Propco 
would be a wholly owned subsidiary of Devco, and therefore 
Investco would still have laid out the same amount as if 
it had purchased the land a!"ld developed itself ( less 
Devco's development profit), but. it would have deducted for 
incc~e tax purposes that portion of the total costs 
represented by the rent it paid (depending on the 
structure, this could exceed 90% of the total cost). 
Variations involve using (as Propco) instead of a wholly 
owned subsidiary, an associated company owned (directly or 
indirectly) by the holding company of Investco, or a 
company which.is not wholly owned by Investco (i.e. a joint 
venture). Even where Propco is a wholly owned subsidiary 
(the common variant), it may have a different board of 
directors, and may trade in its own right, or it ~ay be 
especially created or resurrected (from dormancy) to fulfil 
the role of holder of the bare dominion only. 
It is not proposed to examine the income tax consequences 
of 'the structure in this note, save to record that. t:ie 
benefits could be considerable, and it is assumed (for the 
purposes of this note) that the rent paid will be allowed 
as a valid deduction against Investee's income, that Devco 
will be allowed to treat the property as trading stock 
( amalgar.iating rent and sale consideration as income against 
- 9 
a deduction consisting of the purchase price and 
development costs), and that the structure will not fall 
foul of the anti-avoidance provisions of §103 of the Income 
Tax Act9 • While the above matters are beyond the scope of 
this note, suffice to say that there are cogent arguments 
in favour of the assunptions made above, even in respect 
of the applicability of §103 (which is somewhat rigid in 
application) . 18 
The crisp point which this note seeks to address is this: 
~ill a court, accepting that in terms of the Incone Tax 
Act 11 the structure discussed above is unobjectionable, 
decline to allow Investec its deduction of rent on the 
grounds that the corporate veil must be lifted to reveal 
the reality of t.he underlying situation, i.e. will the 
court pierce the corporate veil? 
9 op cit 
10 see Meyerowit= 
paras 1613 - 1519 
11 op cit 




3. THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS 
Cilliers & Benade12 arrange the instances where the South 
African courts have disregarded the separate corporate 
personality of a company, into 7 categories. It is 
convenient to follow their broad categorisation (to which 
an eighth will be added); however, it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that the courts' approach appears 
to be essentially ad hoc and based largely on the facts of 
each case. 
a. Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre aJld Rubber 
col3 
In this case, the first exception to Salomon' sJ 4 
case to be recognised by the English courts, the 
House of Lords held that they we~e entitled to look 
beyond the fact tha~ the Daimler Co Ltd was 
incorporated in Great Britain, to the fact that all 
its members were domiciled in Germany, which was at 
the time a~ war with Britain, in order to categorise 
the company as an enemy alien. 
Tl"'.is category, based on "paral:!.ount ~i..:blic irrterest", 
deals with nationality, and often (but not always) 




Cilliers & Benade, et al Corpc~ate Law, 2nd ed, pp 11-12 
[19!5] 2 AC 307 
op cit: 
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As it was said by Flemming, J: 15 
"Die gevalle wat ek aldus sal noem is: . . . As 
dit gaan om 'n bepaalde kwaliteit van die 
regspersoon, kan volgens die mate van beheer, 
eienskappe van die beheerders of aandeelhouers 
aan die regspersoon oorgedra word .... Ek kan my 
voorstel dat by die vraag of 'n maatskappy 'n 
vermoende koper o: 'n aanvaarbare borg is, daar 
gekyk kan ·,,ord na die persone •,;at hul 
ondersteuning aan die maatskappy gee en hulle 
finansies. Die assosiasie van sy beheerders ~et 
die maatskappy gee hom 'n kleur af." 
An example of where the courts declined to lift the 
veil is Dadoo's case16 where despite the fact th2t 
the promoters had used the company to circumvent a 
statutory provision, Innes CJ held that the 
Daimler17 case was to be distinguished as in t:ie 
latter case the enquiry related to attributes which 
in the nature of things could not attach to a mere 
legal pers-::::na, e.g. a company cannot have an 2nezny 
character, or be disloyal. On the qther hanc., a 
company could hold land, and ownership of such land 
·,_;ould vest in the company, and :,ct 
shareholders. 
15 Botha v Van .Viekeri<:. en 'n Ander 1983 { 3) SA 513 pl) a-:: ::,~.:. 
16 op cit 
17 op cit 
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Clearly, however, this exception has no relevance to 
the question of whether the veil should be lifted in 
the context of the postulated scheme. 
b. Underlying Partnership 
In so;ae cases, the courts have recognised ~he 
existence of companies", or "quasi-
partnerships". An example is the case of Ebrahi:v.i v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Anos18 , where the 
underlying intention was one of partnership, although 
the partners formed a company to put it into effect. 
Here, where Ebrahimi was removed as director in 
accord:rnce with the articles (his erstwhile "partn:~r" 
& the 11partner' s" son having voted him out of 
office), Lord Wilberforce held (allowing the ~inding 
up of the company on t:1e "just and equitable ground") 
that: 
II a limited company is more than a mere legal 
enti -:..y, '.vi t:i a personality in law of i ~s o·..,--n: 
that there is room in company law for 
recognition of the fact that behind it, or 
amongst it, there are individuals, ~l~~ righ~s, 
expectations and obligations inter se which are 
not necessarily submerged in the company 
•o 
structure.," .i. -
18 [:937] AC 360 (~L) 
19 Ebrahimi's case, op cit, at 379 B-C 
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The learned Lord Justice went on to note that while 
this did not entitle a person to disregard the 
obligations he assumed by entering a company, it did 
allow the court to subject the exercise of legal 
rights in this context to equitable considerations of 
a personal chatacter arising between individuals. 20 
Once again, it is clear that tl'lis exception to the 
doctrine cannot be of assistance to the pcstulated 
set of facts addressed by this note. 
c. Tax liability 
Cilliers & Benade ~rite that: 
"As far as the tax liability of a company is 
concerned the courts will not permit t~e true 
state of affairs to be concealed by provisions 
in the company document ( in the objects clai.~se, 
for example). Regard would be had to the real 
intention of the board of directr.rs and 
members. 112 2. 
While a:: fi:-st sight., t.jis principle ::-,ay see:1 to be 
of direct relevance to our set of facts, on closer 
investigation of the authorities it appears clear 
that the courts here are concerned with looking 
20 
21 
Ebrahimi's case op c•· 




within a given company (typically to determine 
intention) - for example the Elandsheuwel case22 I 
where a company which had held land with a capital 
intention for many years was found to have changed 
that intention to a revenue one ( and thus became 
liable for tax on the proceeds), not because of any 
actions it took in connection with developing, etc, 
the land (one of the nor~al tests), but because its 
shareholding changed, and the new shareholders had a 
"revenue" intention with respect to the compar,y' s 
asset, the land. 
It is clear, however, that this principle does not 
extend to the recognition of groups for tax purposes 
in tax law23 (as distinct from the question whether 
courts will lift the veil and look at groups as a 
whole in connection with other, broader concerns). As 
Meyerowitz 24 puts it: 
"The fact that companies are associated through 
shareholding or that one company is the holding 
company of another has no bearing on the income 
tax position. Each company is a separate legal 
entity, separate even fron its shareholders, and 
the deductibility of any expenditure incurred by 
one company in relation to another must be 
22 C: Elandsheuwel Farming (Ed~s) 
Binnelandse Inkcmste 1978 (1) SA 101 (A) 
3pk v Se.<retaris van 
23 c::: Oc.':berg c:::~. i0""1 _;:; 215 , ~ - .J -
24 op cit, para 723 
C 
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judged in exactly the same way as if there were 
no association between them." 
d. Agency 
There is no reason ~hy a co~pany should not act as an 
agent of its shareholders. The problem arises ~here 
the courts see~ to use the law of agency ... ,,., C..v 
circumvent the problens ~hich ~ould otherwise arise 
from a too strict application of the principle in 
Salomon's case. 25 In this case, 11 the rules of 
agency are applied to regulate a situation for 
which they were not designed. 1126 
Gower27 , recognising that it is difficult ( in the 
light of Salomon's case28 ) to persuade the ccurt to 
draw an inference of agency, divides the cases where 
the courts have been asked to do s0 into two areas -
the first is where the inference they are asked to 
draw is that a subsidiary company has acted as agent 
for its holding company. He argues that the court is 
less reluctant in these cases (this contention is 
discussed below under t~e heading of "Groups''), t~an 






Cilliers & 3enade op cit, pll 




its individual shareholders. Even in such cases (i.e. 
Gower's second category of cases): 
II they have not been willing to do so except 
where that is necessary to frustrate some grave 
impropriety, and in such circumstances they have 
coupled the description of t!'le csmpany as an 
agent with nore pejorative descriptions, such as 
"sham, 11 "cloak," "device," "stratagem," 
"puppet," "creature," etc. In truth they 
themselves seem to have been using a cloak, that 
of agency principles, to give legal 
respectability to the use of a sledgehammer. 1129 
Accordingly, this second category of cases will be 
dealt with under the heading of "alter ego, cloak or 




"It is hardly worthwhile torturing 'agency' to 
save 1 entity 111 • 31 
Gower, op ci=, ?124 
op ci=, pll 
Cf Latty 1935-36 Michigan Law Review 59i, 611 
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e. Groups 
Will the courts look to the fact that a company is a 
wholly owned, or controlled, subsidiary within a 
group, with consolidated accounts, and (possibly) 
common boards of directors, and look at the group as 
a whole, rather than at the conpanies as separate 
entities? In South Africa the courts have always 
followed the view as set out by Cilliers & Benade32 : 
"The mere fact that a holding company is able to 
control the subsidiary does not make the 
subsidiary its agent. As a consequence of the 
separate legal personalities of the holding and 
subsidiary companies the subsidiary itself and 
not its holding company will have to institute 
actions and enforce its rights The 
traditional common law approach is thus that 
holding and subsidiary companies possess ~heir 
own legal personalities, rights, assets and 
liabilities." 
The learned authors go on to provide that while 
modern commercial practice has caused modifications 
( for exa:::ple the ;ireparat.ion cf group accounts) , 11 the 
holding ccmpany and its subsidiaries do not thereby 
lose their separate legal personalities 11 • 33 
32 
33 
op c.:..:, at 432 
Cilliers & Benade, op cit, p433 
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This exposition of the law is in accordance with the 
South African authorities, viz the remarks of 
Centlivres CJ in R v Milne and Erleigh (7) 34 : 
"The persons who wield the controlling power are 
the only legal personae apart from the companies 
themselves. There is no persona which is the 
group, and there are no interests involved 
except the interests of t:1e companies and the 
interests of the contro:lers. This is not mere 
legal technicality ... No business man would be 
deceived into thinking t~at in a group there is, 
in effect, a pooling of assets and a right in 
the controllers to deal with assets belonging to 
the companies without regard to their respective 
interests." 
This case has been followed i~ the field of civil law 
as well, for example being quoted by Preiss, Jin the 
case of Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd 
and Another35 • In that case the applicant had a 
right of pre-emption over certain mineral rights held 
by the second respondent (an external ~ompany). The 
second respondent, for administrative convenience, 
sold all its assets (incl~ding the mineral rights) to 
the first respondent, its wholly-owned subsidiary. 
For various bona fide reasons the rights were valued 
at an extremely low· book value of Rl18, while it 
35 
1951 ( l) SA 7c, (.:\) "''- 323 
1985 (4) SA 615 (T) 
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since transpired that they were worth some millions 
of rands. The applicant, learning of the sale, 
applied to court to exercise its pre-emptive right 
and purchase at the derisory amount of Rll8. The 
court held as follows 36 : 
"It is clear that the transactions between the 
respondents, whatever• the consequences nay tur~ 
out to be, were genuine contracts, designed to 
vest the South African assets of an externa2. 
company in its wholly-owned local subsidiary. 
They cannot be stigmatised as constituting a 
cloak, or a fiction or a sham. The framing of 
group accounts in the form chosen by the 
respondents does not in my view advance their 
cause. They ~emain, as holding company and 
wholly-owned subsidiary respectively, separate 
personae with separate identities 
therefore not prepared to piecce the veil" 
I an 
However, (as remarked on above, on page 15), Gower 
argues37 that there is a tendency, in the English 
courts, to be more sympathetic towards the idea of 
treating a group as a whole. In developing this 
argument., he relies pri:i.cipally on t.;o cases. 
first, Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham 
Corporation38 , (where Atkinson, J allowed a holding 
36 at 625G to 626A 
37 
38 [1939[ 4 All Er 116 (KB) 
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company to claim compensation by reason of the 
compulsory acquisition of the property of its 
subsidiary) was severely criticised by Pennington 39 
in a passage quoted with approval by Goldstone Jin 
the Banco de Moqambique case40 : 
"For example, in SJni th/ Stone and Knight Ltd v 
Birmingham Corporation Atkinson J described the 
subsidiary company as 'the agent or enplcyee, or 
tool or si:nulacru,"71' of the holding conpany, 
words which are obviously intended to be read in 
a metaphorical rather than a legal sense. Indeed 
in that case it was unnecessary for the Court to 
find that the subsidiary was the holding 
company's agent in order to reach the decision 
that the holding company was in occupation of 
the premises compulsorily purchased." 
The second main case (he quotes a number of iJther 
cases, decided prior to this one, in support) relied 
upon by Gower is the case of D .H .N. Ltd v Tower 
Hamlets London 3orouqh Counci1 41 • Gower states that 
in that case, Lord Denning, MR was prepared: 
39 
II to adopt a statement in che previous 
edition of this book that 'there is evidence of 
a general tendency to ignore the separate legal 
entities of various companies within a group, 
Pennington, Company Law, 4th ed, p54 
40 Banco de l1oqa.'7lbique v I.-iter-Science 
Development Services (?':.y) :,cd !.982 (3) SA 330 (T) 
Researc.': a.t1d 
41 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852, C.A. 
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and to look instead at the economic entity of 
the whole group.' And this time in lifting the 
veil he was able to carry both his colleagues 
with him. The court held that 'The three 
companies should, for present purposes, be 
treated as one, and the parent company, D.H.N., 
should be treated as that one. 11 ,; 2 
In that case the 2.and vested in one of two ·,,holly 
owned subsidiaries in a group carrying on a grocery 
business - if the veil had not been lifted the 
plaintiffs would have been defeated on a mere 
technicality since the land could at any time have 
been transferred from the subsidiary to the parent 
comr,any. 43 
The English courts have since, however, moved away 
from this concept. In Re Southard & Co Ltd~4 , Lord 
Templeton was .at pains to uphold ~he contrary view, 
holding that a parent company may spawn many 
subsidiaries, and if any one should go insolvent, tne 
parent company may properly be without .liability for 
the debts of the insolvent subsidiary. 
It is now clear (if it was ever in any doubt) that 
our courts also, do not follow the view espoused by 
42 Gower, op - ~· ~ ~- .... I p.:.31-2 
43 Gower, op c.;..:, p2.31-2, not.as 36 & 31 
44 (1979] All ER 556 (HL) 
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Gower. The AD has recently reaffirmed its view (first 
enunciated in R v !1ilne & Erleigh 45 ) that groups may not 
be looked at as a whole, in the case of Wambach v Maizecor 
Industries (Edms) Bpk46 , where Van Heerden, JA held as 
follows 47 : 
"Die respondent se advokaat het ... egter beroep 
op 'n aantal meestal Engelse gewysdes 
waarin, so is aangevoer, daar 'n ontsluiering 
van korporatiewe identiteite plaasgevind het ten 
einde gevolge te gee aan kommersiele realiteite. 
Nie een van die gewysdes is in die onderhawige 
geval van nut nie .... In die verbygaan kan ek 
meld dat in Adams and Others v Cape Industries 
plc and Another48op 532 en 543, die Court of 
Appeal klaa.·cblyklik nie akkord gegaan het nie 
met uitlatings in vroeere beslissings aangaande 
onsluiering (sic) waarop die respcndent se 
advokaat peil probeer trek iet." 
There is accordingly no room for the argument that as 
Investec and Propco form part of the s;:ime group, 
Propco being a wholly-owned subsidiary. of Investco, 
the courts will take a robust view of the scheme, 
looking at it as a whole and ignoring the existence 
46 1993 ( 2) SA 559 (A) 
at 6753-:: 
48 [1991) 1 All ER 929 (Ch and CA) 
\ 
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of the separate companies. Something more than being 
part of a group is required. 
f. Fraud 
Fraud has always been seen as a circunstance 
justifying the lifting of the veil, and if fraud is 
present, the courts have ~ot hesitated to pierce the 
veil so as to make the individual controllers liable. 
A good illustration of the court's approach is the 
case of Gilford.Motor Co v Horne 49 • There Horne had 
entered into a restraint of trade agreement 
(including inter alia an agreeme7t not to solicit its 
customers) with the company while he was employed by 
it. He left its employ, and formed a company ~hich 
undertook the solicitation. As Gower notes 50 , the 
remarkable thing was that: 
50 
"An injunction was granted against both him and 
the company (notwithstanding that it was no~ a 
party to the contract). The .company was 
described in the judgement as 'a device, a 
stratagem, ' and a '::-.ere cloak er sham. ' " 
[1933] C~ 935 (CA) 




This approach has been followed in our law where Le 
Roux J, in the case of Lategan v Boyes and Ano51 , 
referred with approval to the words of Judge Sanborn 
in US v !1ilwaukee Refrigerator Transit co52 , where 
he held that a company should be seen as an entity: 
"but, when the notion of legal entity is used to 
defeat public convenience, justify ·,;rang, 
protect fraud or defend crime, the law "'ill 
regard the corporation as an association." 
The learned judge went on to state that this approach 
"appears to be in line with that in modern England 
and is based on common sense and a developed 
sense of equity. 1153 He then refers with approval to 
Gi '!.ford's ~ase54', but also cites the case of Orkin 
Bros Ltd v Bell 55 as authority for the proposition. 
I must, however, respectfully agree with the re~arks 
of Professor Blackman56 (quoting Professor R.C. 
Benthin57 ) that the true basis of the decision 
(where directors were held personally liable to a 
seller who had sold goods to a company at their 






1980 (4) SA 191 (T) 
at 201A 
op cit 
1921 TPD 92 
56 Professor 3lack.~an Notes on Company Law, u~published notes 
prepared for the Comrne~cial Law Department, UCT, 1984 
57 Benthin, R.C. Studies in the field of South African Law, 
Principally Company Law Vol 1 at 63 - unpublished LLD thesis 
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that the tompany was in insolvent circumstances and 
totally unable to pay for the purchase, and where it 
appeared that the sole purpose of the transaction had 
been to diminish their personal liability under a 
contract of suretyship) was: 
II the fact that when directors order goods 
there is an inplied representation by then that 
they believe that the co~pany will probably be 
able to pay for the goods, and if they know 
there. is no such likelihood, then they comr.iit 
such a fraud as falls within the principles laid 
down in Derry v Peak [1889) 14 App. Cas. 
337_1158 
Be that as it may, however, Le Roux J went on to find 
(with respect, correctly, notwithstanding his 
::a 
erroneous reliance on Orkin's case-J), th~t: 
"I have no doubt that our Courts would brush 
aside the veil of corporate identity t~me and 
time again where fraudulent use is made of the 
fiction of :i..2.gal personality. In the present 
case, however, there is no evidence (of fraud)". 
The case concerned a loan t= a cornpany wholly owned 
by the defendants, and in respect of which the 
defendants had entered into a contract of suretyship. 
The terms of the loan were varied without reference 
58 Black.-nan, op cit, "Disregarding -:he separate existence of 
the Corporate entity: ?iercing the Cor~orate Veil" p2 
59 op cit 
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to the deed of suretyship (although the second 
defendant signed the amendment to the loan on behalf 
of the company). The defendants took the point that 
they had signed on beh2.lf of the company, not as 
sureties. In reply, the plaintiffs contended that the 
court should lift the veil. Le Roux, J went on to 
find that60 : 
"In fact the · evidence shows that all par-:.ies 
concerned, including the attorneys acting for 
the mortgagor and nortgagee, forgot about the 
contract of suretyship when the amending 
agreement was signed. It follows that no 
question of fraud arises in this case The 
fact that the second defendant, well-knowing 
what the terms of the amE·nding agreement were, 
now takes a sharp point on prejudice does not 
constitute a fraud on the plaintiffs, althcugh 
it offends one's sense of equity." (my it·ilics) 
The significance of the italicised words is that the 
fact even when that which is done seems inequitable 
and a "sharp point", 
constitute-fraud. 
it does not necessarily 
While the learned judge did remark61 that "It is 
interesting to note that the Canadian Courts have 







companies exc~pt upon proof of fraud ... and there 
seems no reason to believe that, save where 
authorised by statute, our Courts would go further at 
the present juncture" this has been dissented from -
see Botha v van Niekerk en 'n Ander62 : 
"Te oordeel aan die ·formulering van die gedeelte 
wat op 202A van die uitspraak (i.e. Latega~'s 
case63 ) verskyn, is dit waarskynlik verkeerd om 
te se dat beslis is dat bedrog altyd 'n 
voorvereiste is 'n akkurate en volledige 
formulering van die perke van so 'n ignorering 
(van die skeidslyn · tussen 'n maatskappy en sy 
aandeelhouers) nie moontlik is nie. Dit is te 
rneer in 'n regstelsel wat nie vir groei en 
ontwikkeling suiwer van wetgewing afhanrlik is 
nie." 
Another example of fraud was the case of Cattle 
Breeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Veldman 64 • Here the 
appellant company owned the farm on which its sole 
sh~reholder had set up the matrimonial home with his 
wife. In due course he committed adultery, left the 
farm, and then proceeded to have the company attempt 
to eject her from the farm (an action he could not 
have taken without offering alternative 
accommodation). The learned Chief Judge ignored the 
62 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) at 519D-? 
63 op ci: 
64 1974(1) SA 169 (RA). 
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fact that the company (and not the husband, who owed 
the duty) owned the farm, and treated the company as 
the husbands alter ego,. holding that it "possessed no 
greater ri.ghts to eject the respondent than (the 
husband) himself possessed. 1165 
Another exa~ple, witj superficially similar facts to 
Gilford' s case66 is the case of J Lo11;,; and Co ( Pty) 
Ltd v Richter and Others67 • In this case Richter 
owned a road-~arking patent, and the parties 
envisaged him transferring it to his company, J co, 
which entered into an igreement (during 1979) with 
the plaintiff whereby, inter alia, the plaintiff 
obtained an exclusive licence over the patent, and 
both J co & Kichter were restrained, directly or 
indirectly from being interested in any road-marking 
business whatsoever. 
In the event the patent was never transferrec to the 
plaintiff, as it was attached and sold in execution 
before Richter coL..ld transfer it. This put paid to 
the plaintiff's licence. 
During 1985, a ccnpany called Lyncor (for~ed du=~ng 
1983 by Richter) was successful in tendering for road 




Cattle Breeders case, op cit, 171F-G 
op cit 
1987 (2) SA 237 (N) 
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competition with the plaintiff). Plaintiff sought an 
interdict against Richter and Lyncor. The learned 
judge, assuming that the covenant had come into 
force, noted that whether it had been breached by 
Richter or not, Lyncor had not been a party to the 
covenant. As: to whether he should pierce the 
corporate veil, the learned judge reviewed the 
decisions in Lategan & .-u.no6c I 3anco de 
,1 b · 69 ,·1oqaii1 .1que , Botha v Van l:iekerk70 ana Dithuba 
Platinum71 , but found no authority. While he 
recognised that the Gilford !1otor case72 did go as 






"I am not disposed to follow the decision. That 
it was proper in the circumstances to enjoin the 
company seems to have !Jeen taken largely for 
granted .... The case for an injunction against 
the company was a good deal stronger, what is 
more, than one for an interdict against Lyncor 
happens to be. The covenanter had formed the 
company, the Court found, with the specific 
intention of using it to evade the restraint, of 
manipulating it so that it did in_his interests 
and for his benefit things which he was not at 







the beginning to a 'mere cloak or sham' , to 
naught but a 'device', a 'stratagem', a 'mask', 
as Lord Hanworth MR characterised it. That 
Lyncor was likewise conceived in sin does not 
emerge. Nor is so much suggested. It appears to 
have been established innocently, honestly and 
for purposes that ~ere quite above board. It was 
certainly not conjured up so that Richter, 
disguis~d by it, r:.ight compete with Lauw in 
tendering for and attending to the job now 
hand.This! say because, by the time the tenders 
were solicited, it had existed and functioned 
for some eighteen months. 1173 
~ccordingly, it is clear that the courts ~ill lift 
the veil if fraud is present. Thus if fra~d is part 
of our proposed scheme, tha~ is will be sufficient t~ 
persuade the court to ignore the form and lock at the 
substance, i.e. the group as a whole, disregarding 
the individual corporate entities. 
But is there fraud present in that scenario (even in 
the "pure" form ?) • It will be remembered that 
~' Lateqan 's 1 "' case :ound tha,: so::iething can of::enc. 
one's sense of equity, and still not constitute 
fraud. 
73 
74 op cit 
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It is submitted that what is being done in terms of 
the scheme cannot be characterised as fraud on 
anyone, even Revenue. Propco is not being used by 
Investco to do something Investco cannot do itself, 
nor to evade any contractual obligations of Investco. 
It is quite legitimate to put property into one 
company and the o;:erations into another, fer- all 
sorts of quite proper business reasons. The question 
must also be posed as to just how is Revenue being 
defrauded - everything required by Revenue has been 
disclosed, it is free to ask any further questions it 
may wish, and the structure cannot be attacked even 
under the wide anti-avoidance provisions of the 
Act75 • 
More importantly, it is submitted, the Income Tax 
Act 76 its elf inplici tly recognises that a taX?ayer 
may so arrange his affairs, using "groups" or 
"associated" companie·s, so as to avoid tax 0::.her-...rise 
payable - by specifically providing, for example, for 
a definition of "a.:;sociated institution1177 • 
The language used oy the courts is sometimes 
confusing, beca'.lse ,; as ',,;e shall see belcw on naae 
3 3) , a further category of cases where the ccurts 
75 Income Tax Ac~, cp =it 
76 
77 in connectio:1 wit;-i inccme tax levied 
granted as a ccnccmmita:::t of employment - Para 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act, op cit 
on fr i::i;e 




will lift the veil is where a company is used as an 
alter ego, a 'sham', 'mask', or 'puppet' of another -
in such cases: 
II the .general principal underlying this 
aspect of the law of lifting the veil is that, 
when the corporationris the mere alter ego or 
business conduit of a person, it may be 
disregarded. This rule has been adopted in those 
cases where the idea of the corporate entity has 
been used as a subterfuge and to observe 
would work an injustice. 1178 
Accordingly, this latter category must be 
differentiated from pure fraud (although the courts 
also use the terminology of "sham", "mask" etc, in 
connection with fraud. 79 ). It is submitted that 
fraud has ~annotations of deliberate hiding away, of 
the concealment of material facts. Thus, as it has 
been argued_ that deliberate dishonesty is not 
present, then the structure cannot, it is submitted, 
be characterised as fraudulent (although escaping 
such a characterisation does not necessarily mean 
that the courts will refuse to lift the veil) . 
Accordingly it is necessary to discuss under ~.;hat 
further circumstances (i.e. where fraud in the pure 
sense is not present) will the courts be prepared to 
pierce the veil. 
78 Cape ?aci=ic case, cp c~=, at 815J-81,A 




g. After ego, cloak or sham 
A classic example of where the courts ignored the 
corporate veil was in the case of Robinson v 
Randfontein Estates Gold Nining Co Ltd80 , where a 
director attempted to avoid his fiduciary duties to 
a cor.ipany of which he was chairman by creating a 
subsidiary, and selling to that company. This was 
accordingly a sale to a company of which he was not 
a director and thus he avoided the disclosure he 
would have had to have made, had he sold to the 
company of which he was chairman. The courts simply 
ignored the subsidiary and held that there had been 
a breach of Robinson's fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff (holding) company. 
Perhaps the most extreme case of a refusal to lift 
the veil under this head, is a New Zealand case heard 
by the Privy Council, Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd81 • 




" Lee, for the purpose of carrying on hj s 
l::usiness of aerial top-dressing, had formed a 
company of which he beneficially owned all the 
shares and was sole 'governing director'. He was 
also appointed chief pilot .... He was killed in 
1921 AD 168 
[1961] i\.C. 12 ?.C. 
op cit, pl23 
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a flying accident. The Court of Appeal in New 
Zealand held that his widow was not entitled to 
compensation (under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act) since Lee could not be regarded as a 
'worker' But the Privy Council h~ld 
that Lee· and his company were distinct legal 
entities which had entered into contractual 
relationships under which he became, qua chief 
pilot, a servant of the company .... In effect 
the magic of corporate personality enabled hi~ 
to be master and servant at the same time and to 
get all the advantages of both - and linited 
liability". 
Possibly the locus classicus under this head is the 
case of Wallersteiner v Uoir83 , where various 
companies through which Dr Wallersteiner (the 
appellant) had operated were dealt with by Denning MR 
~s if they were "just puppets of Dr Waller~"'..:einer": 
"He (Dr Wallersteiner) controlled their every 
movement. Each danced to his biddi~g. He pulled 
the strings. No-one else got within reach of 
them. Transformed into legal language, they were 
his agents to do as he commanded. He ,.-,as ::he 
principal behind them. I am of the opinion that 
the court should pull aside the corporate veil 
and treat these concerns as being his creatures 
83 Wallersteiner 
[1974] 3 All ER 217 (CA) 




responsible. 1184 ' 
he should be and is 
As far as South African Courts are concerned, in the 
Banco de Moqambique case85 , Goldstone J was asked to 
lift the veil and inf er that the Government of 
Mozambique (being the sole shareholder in the Banco 
de .Moc;:ambique - · the central bank) was the real or 
beneficial owner of the corporation's assets. In his 
judgement86 Goldstone, J referred with approval both 
to the extract from Gower quoted above (in connection 
with the discussion on agency, see page 16) as well 





"The tenuous evidence from which the Court has 
implied an agency or trusteeship in some of the 
foregoing cases naturally leads one to question 
wheth~r the agency or trusteeship is net nerely 
a convenient legal fiction used by the Court to 
enable it to give decisions which it thinks 
j~st. The description of the subsidiary as the 
holding corripany' s agent or ··.:rustee often appears 
to be merely an epithet used to. indicate the 
subsidiary's complete subjugation to the holding 
company, and a stat:er.;e:nt their legal 
relationship at all. 11 
Wallerstei~er's case, op cit, at l013 
op cit 
at 344-5 
Pennington Company Law, 4th ed, p54 
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The learned judge went on to refer to Lord 
Macnaughten's judgement in Salomon's case 88 
(already quoted, during the introductory remarks to 
this note, above on page 1), and held that: 
"In the present case no single reason has been 
advanced for creating a new category of case 
where corporate personality should be ignored 
It is not necessary for De to consider the 
very few cases where in our la~ the Courts have 
'pierced the corporate veil'. Suffice it to say 
that in the present case I can conceive of no 
principle of law· whereby such a radical step 
would be justified 11 • 89 
The most recent example to exercise the ~inds of our 
courts is the case of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd & J\.nos 90 . Here 
Cape Pacific purchased from the first defendant, in 
1979, the shares in F com~any, ownership of which 
entitled one to the use and occupation of a Clifton 
=lat. The shares were not, however, transferred to 
plaintiff, but rather tci second defendant, and the 
court held that this was done on the instructions of 
third defendant (Lubner) ..:.J.J. an attempt to evade 
plaintiff's claim thereto. The court accepted that 




Banco de .'!oqambique, op cit. at 345 C-? 
1993 (2) SA 784 (C) 
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al though a large part of this control was via his 
control of the trustees of various trusts set up by 
his father for the benefit of Lubner's children. 
Plaintiff had previously obtained judgement against 
first defendant for delivery of the shares, but this 
had not taken place as the shares had already been 
transferred to second defendant and first defendant 
could not compel secohd defendant to hand over the 
shares (s~cond defendant ·was not named in that 
action). 
The case turned on whether the court should "pierce 
the corporate·veil", because effective control of all 
the companier~ had at all times vested in Lubner and 
because the companies had transferred the shares 
amoilg themselves on Lubner's instructions in order to 
defeat plaintiff's claim thereto. 
The court held, per Nel J, that while the first 
defendant was ~he vehicle through which first 
defendant controlled the shares in F company, there 
was no evidence which indicates that the purchase of 
those shares: 
" had not been an ordinary transaction and 
that it had been made solely for the benefit of 
Lubner or for some sinister purpose. (First 
defendant) was at all material times a fully 
owned subsidiary of the children's trusts 
I; 
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(and) had assets worth well in excess of Rl 
000 000 and could not, in my view, be 
described as a puppet, a sham, a mask or the 
alter ego of Lubner. Lubner did control the 
affairs of (first defendant) and did act as if 
the flat belonged to him. This night perhaps not 
have been to the advantage of the children I s 
trusts but the corporate entity ;1as 
certainly not used as a subterfuge or an 
instrument of fraud or inproper conduct. The 
'lifting' or I piercing of (first defendant I s) 
1 corporate veil I would thus not, in my vie·.,;, 
assist the plaintiff .... 1191 
As far as second defendant: (GLI) was concerned, the 
learned judge held: 
91 
"In :i.979 GLI had already been a long-established 
company with assets well in excess of R2 000 
000. It also cannot be described as a sham, a 
mask or the alter ego of Lubner. Although owned 
and controlled by Lubner, it carried on business 
as a separate entity and was not used as a 
subterfuge or an instrument of fraud or improper 
conduct. The transfer of the (F company) shares 
to GLI was not done surreptitiously in that the 
plaintiff had been informed thereof during June 
Cape Pacific case, op cit at 821F-H 
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1980 before the institution of the first 
action. 1192 
What is relevant in respect of our postulated facts, 
is that while the court found that Lubner used 
corporate entities to defeat the plaintiff's claim, 
it refused to look behind those entities, firstly 
because there ~as no fraud (plaintiff was aware of 
the sale and could have joined second defendant in 
the first action), and secondly (and, with respect, 
more importantly) because the entities used were (and 
had been for some tine) meaningful trading companies 
in their own right, with substantial assets of their 
own. In such circumstances, the fact that they 
"danced to Lubner' s bidding", that he "pulled the 
strings 1193 , was irrelevant. 
The Cape Pacific case is to be contrasted with the 





II the defendant attempted to avoid completing 
the sale of his house to the plaintiff by 
conveying it to a company formed for the 
purpose. In ordering both the defendant and his 
company specifically to perform the contract 
with the plaintiff, Russel J. described the 
Cape Pacific case, op cit, at 821I-J 
Cf Wallerstei.ner's case, op cit 
(1962] W.L.R. 832 
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company as 'the creature of the ... defendant, 
a device and a· sham, a mask which he holds 
before his face in an attempt to avoid 
recognition by the eye of equity. 1195 
The lesson is clear - assuming an absence of fraud 
within the structure, the courts may well decline to 
lift the veil if Propco is a substantial company, 
trading in its own right with substantial assets (for 
example if it holds all the property of the group, 
and has done so for some time). On the other hand, 
even in the absence of fraud, where Propco is newly 
formed to hold the bare dominion in respect of one 
transaction (or possibly is resurrected from dormancy 
for such pcrpose), and does no other trading, it is 
highly likely, it is submitted, that the courts will 
ht:ld that it is a "sham", a "puppet" er the alcer ego 
of Investec, and thus lift the veil. 
h. The interests of Justice 
There is one final category, not mentioned by 
Cilliers & Benade96 , or Gower97 , •,,hich was first 








Ander98 In this case Van Niekerk purchased a house 
from plaintiff II in his own name and that of a 
nominee". He failed to provide guarantees as 
provided for in the contract, and when same were 
demanded, he eventually responded by declaring that 
he had nominated a newly formed company (with Rl of 
capital), to purchase in his place. Plaintiff sought 
to hold him to the contract, as she saw the co~pany 
as a "man" of straw. 
Justice Flemming "subjected the doctrine (of lifting 
the veil) to an exacting and wide-ranging 
analysis 1199 • After analyzing the South African as 
well as overseas cases, he concludes that it is 
difficult to lay down.hare and fast rules - however: 
"Dit laat nag steeds die taak om 'n grondslag te 
vini of redes te stel waarom in hierdie geval by 
die afsonderlikheid van die maatskappy volstaan 
word. A:!.. skyn geformuleerde reels onprakties en 
al kan bindende presedente nie aangehaal word 
nie, moet 'n benadering tot hierdie geval tog 
gevind 
vermy 11100 
word om "palm-tree justice" te 
His Lordship concluded that while none of the 
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Botha's case, op cit, at 520E 
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veil, at a later stage, on the proof of further facts 
the matter may well fall within the rule enunciated 
in the case of Orkin Bros Ltd v Bell and Others101 • 
Similarly, on liquidation of the company, it may be 
able to rely on Robinson's case102 , and claim 
damages from Van Niekerk. He went on to conclude that 
even if at a later stage, the company proves to be 
unable to meet its obligations, and there are no 
grounds on which plaintiff can recover her damages 
(if any) this would not justify the court to find, on 
the basis of the present situation, that Van Niekerk 
should be personally responsible. He concluded by 
finding that: 
"Ek meen dat daar in hierdie geval ook net tot 
'n konklusie van persoonlike aans;-reeklikheid 
sou kon kom as daar ten minste 'n oortuiging was 
dat applikante 'n ondulbare onreg aangedoen word 
en wel ten gevolg van iets wat vir die 
regdenkende duidelik onbehoorlike optrede aan 
die kant van eerste respondent is. 11103 
In the circumstances, as the applicant had entered 
into the contract without stipulating that any 
nominee had - t.o be financially secure, and 
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until she had received her price, the learned judge 
declined to lift the veil. 
This test was referred to by Nel, J in the Cape 
Pacific case104 , apparently with approval, where he 
said (after finding that neither GLI, nor the first 
defendant company, were alter egos or "puppets" of 




"The transfer of the (F company) shares to GLI 
was not done surreptitiously in that the 
plaintiff had been informed thereof during June 
1980 before the institution of the first action. 
Plaintiff certainly had had full opportunity to. 
join SLI in that action but did not do so. In 
the circumstances, even if the test formulated 
by Flemming J, namely 'an unconscionable 
injustice suffered as a result of what was, to 
the right-minded person, conduct which was 
clearly improper' ... is applied, the plaintiff 
cannot succeed. The transfer of the shares could 
be described as 'clearly improper' but in my 
view it did not result in an 'unconscionable 
injustice'. .::.s stated, the plai::1tiff had had 
full opportunity to recover the shares from GLI 
but did not do so timeously and is thus the 
author of its own raisfortune. 11105 
op cit, at 522A-3 
ibid, at 821J-822B 
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It is submitted that this test, 
accepted and applied as a 
even should it be 
further class of 
exceptions, would not be applicable to our scheme -
the essence of this test is that someone must have 
suffered ·an "unconscionable injustice", in the 
context of unfairness, · leading to an inequitable 
result. Fleming, J himself cautioned that: 
"Dit sou ten minste .lJescndere gronde verg; iets 
wat 'n redelike dwingende noodsaak skep in die 
beland van geregtigheid om die elementere van 
maatskappystigting ui t te skryf sodat 'n 
aandeelhouer 
aanspreeklik 
kontrakte. " 106 
of direkteur persoonlik 
is op 'n maatskappy se 
It is submitted that it is inherent in the words used 
by the learned judge that what he had in mind was an 
injustice to one of the parties to a contract, 
frustrated by the unfair use of an intervening 
company by another party - to extend the test to 
include "unfairness" or "injustice" towards Reven'-'.e, 
a government department (even assuming that that is 
possible), is it is submitted, stretching his words 
too far. Even if it should be possible to be "unfair" 
towards Revenue, and the test should be extended to 
include such, it is submitted that on the postulated 
facts, that is not what occurred it is open to the 
legislature to "set the rules", and this they have 
106 Botha's case, op cit, at 523H 
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done, to the extent of enacting several anti-
avoidance provisions intended to be broad and wide-
ranging in scope (even though in practice they have 
proved possibly somewhat rigid in application107 ). 
Having done so, they cannot be heard to cry "unfair" 
if a taxpayer so orders his affairs so a~ to fall 
outside the provisions so enacted. It has long been 
recognised that: 
"Avoidance of tax must not be confused with 
evasion of tax. Evasion of tax is a fraud on the 
Revenue, e.g. rendering false returns, 
concealing income and the like. The only 
provisions necessary in regard to evasion of tax 
are those imposing penalties. Tax avoidance 
on the other hand presuppose: some legal 
arrangement or transaction which, but for some 
special provision contained in the Act, would 
not render the taxpayer liable for tax. 11108 
While courts have expressed differing perspectives on 
tax avoidance, Meyerowitz109 notes that the 
judgement of Lord Normand in the case of Vestey' s 





"Parliament in its attempts to keep pace with 
the ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance ~ay fall 
See above, page 9 
Meyerowitz, op cit, para 1612. 
ibid 
[1949] l All ER 1108 (HL) at 1120 
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short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for 
the taxpayers who do not try to avoid their 
share of the burden, and is disappointing to 
Inland Revenue. But the Court will not stretch 
the terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on 
the efforts of Parliament and to stop gaps which 
are left open by the statutes. Tax avoidance is 
an evil, but it would be the beginning of much 
greater evils if the Courts were to overstretch 
the language of the statute in order to subject 
to taxation people of whom they disapproved." 
i, 
"· 
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4. CONCLUSION 
It is, it is submitted, clear from the above exposition 
that most of the heads under which our courts have 
justified lifting the corporate veil, have little 
applicability in relation to the facts postulated in 
respect of the scheme. That is not a case where the 
principle enunciated in the Daimler case111 would be 
applicable, and nor are we dealing with a "domestic" 
company. While special rules do apply when the courts seek 
to determine the intention of a company when it is relevant 
in connection wi.th the levying of income tax, these have 
never stretched beyond the bounds of each individual 
company. 
It has also been argued that our courts will not recognise 
the concept of a "group" of companies, but require 
something more that the mere fact that one company is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of another, to strip aside the 
veil. This "something more" certainly includes fraud, but 
it is submitted that there is no fraud in the propcsed 
structure indeed the Income Tax Act112 implicitly 
recognises that "groups" ("associated companies") can be 
used to avoid tax otherwise payable. Justice Flenming has 
also proposed a further category, based on "an 







submitted that this category has no relevance to the 
postulated facts. 
Only one category remains, therefore, which might persuade 
the court to lift the corporate veil, and treat Propco as 
part of Investc~ (and thereby deny Investec its deduction 
for rent paid)~ This is if Propco can be characterised as 
the alter ego of Investco, merely a "sham", the "puppet", 
or "mask" of Investec. Whether it can so be regarded in 
relation to any actual scheme (based on the principles of 
our scheme above), will depend on a detailed examination 
of the facts of that scheme. 
Broad guidelines appear to be that if Propco is formed 
specifically for the transaction, it is more likely to be 
regarded as a sham, than if it had been formed some time 
before the transaction had taken place, and more 
importantly, lt had traded and conducted other business 
during that time. Also, a court is more likely to regard 
a direct subsidiary as a "puppet" of the holding company 
(assuming some of the other elements are present), than a 
company indirectly controlled113 • Should Propco have a 
diffe~ent board of directors to Investec, this would also 
tend to militate against it being regarded as a sham. 
Similarly, should Propco be partially owned by a third 
party, it would be very difficult for a court to regard it 
as a "puppet" of Investec (unless, of course, the third 
party is owned or controlled by Investec in turn) . The 
113 CF Cape Pacific case, op cit 
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level of assets and business conducted by Propco would also 
be of great relevance to the court - if it has substantial 
assets, apart · from those received in the course of the 
scheme, the court will be far less likely to regard it as 
a mere 11 puppet 11 of its holding company. 
The essence appears · to be that Propco must be a "real 11 
entity, and not something merely put into place to 
facilitate the scheme - just as Devco (for income tax 
considerations) must preferably be a functioning property 
developer with a respectable track record, so must Propco 
preferably be, for example, a functioning property holding 
company for the group, with a mix of performing (rental 
producing) and non-performing assets. In such event, 
Investec may well.succeed in preventing any lifting of the 
veil, and so obtain considerable advantages in the course 
of its business. 
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